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ABSTRACT 
Generally, the assumption is that it is useful to apprehend where a nation has come from, 
historically, in order to successfully map out its future plans. Thus this article, among other 
things, addresses the complex process of democratization in Nigerian politics since 1985. It exam-
ines endeavors by civil society to reinstitute democratic governance in the country following the 
abortion of the Third'Republic on June 12, 1993, and concludes with a possible strategy for 
the sustainment of democracy in the forthcoming republic. 
T HE POLITICAL actions of the military regime within the Nigerian 
system represent an obstacle to the vision of democracy in the republic. This 
was especially so between 1992 and 1994. Endeavors to rectifY the political 
complications emanating from the regime's policies, by relevant groups within 
the civil society, have so far been problematic and unsuccessful. 
It was not that the military's penchant for nullifYing elections was novel. 
It was that the painstaking procedure made by the military to see that the elec-
tions to the Third Republic did not mimic previous ones (as for example, 1979, 
1983) heightened the expectations of the electorates and citizenry. Thus, the 
immediate reactions of the country following one of the numerous foux pas of 
the military, when it annulled the June 12, 1993 presidential election were 
expected, and the consequences predictable. 
It is a given that the country's gestation as a British colony and final birth 
as a sovereign nation-state was mired by political contestations and upheavals 
that continually threatened its tenuous political atomism. Its metamorphosing 
process in nation-building, in evidence as long ago as 1960, has depicted the 
problematic procedure in altering the defective political "genetic" make-up inher-
ited from the womb of colonialism. The inherent instability in the republic 
today flows in part from these historic and political disarticulations. 
The general assumptions were that the military interregna and the occa-
sional renaissance of partisan politics (as for example, 1979) would lead to a 
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major mutation that could change for good the erstwhile contentious genetic 
strands in the country's body politic, and usher in an era of national cohesion 
and political legitimacy. 
For example, each time the army has seized power from a civilian gov-
ernment, it has affirmed that as a fiduciary guardian, it would lead the repub-
lic into political nirvana and genuine democracy after first eradicating the 
nation's endemic corruption, and putting the country's economic house in order, 
inter alia. l But no sooner have the AImed Forces claimed to have acceded to 
power, due to over-whelming pressure from the populace, than some of its 
leaders "serendipitously" found the fortunes of governance so robust that they 
were seduced by the very evil they swore to get rid of.2 As a result, it is really 
tough to relinquish power. So, "the more things change, the more they remain 
the same," is a familiar aphorism that many critics of Nigerian political devel-
opment apply to this phenomenon. 
Central to the proceeding analysis is the notion that if the country is obliv-
ious to its past, it could be condemned to the same pitfalls that led to the 
demise of its three republics. To that end, this disquisition seeks to do the fol-
lowing: 1. Trace briefly events and antinomies leading to the June 12, 1993 
presidential election and its annulment; 2. examine the efficacy (or lack of it) 
of the civil society in tackling the political imbroglios that arose as a result of 
the policies of the military administration; and 3. revisit a possible strategy for 
democratic sustainment in the forthcoming republic. 
Transition to the Third Republic 1985-1992 
The post-independent Nigerian political history is replete with instability 
brought about by corruption, mismanagement, indiscipline, lack of national 
cohesion, et cetera. Indeed, the failure of the Third Republic and plans for the 
fourth (all other things being equal), are indicative of the failures of past endeav-
ors. Moreover, military praetorianism as a presumed strategy for lifting the 
republic from its economic and political miasma has in over two decades of 
its governance lacked efficacy. Coups and counter-coups have become com-
monplace. In fact, no matter how well intended, the military's quest to democ-
ratize the Nigerian polity has not only promoted national angst, malaise, 
dissonance, and the problem of legitimacy, but also left many in bewilderment 
as to the true intentions of the military regimes. Whereas many attribute the 
republic's inconsistencies and, in fact, explain the country's political unsteadi-
ness and dislocation under the rubric of chaos theory (that is, certain phe-
nomena involve so many factors that they are inherently unpredictable),3 others 
place the blame on the military, and their precursors, the weak political class 
for their inability to solve the dysfunctional phenomena inherent in the polity. 
The process toward the Third Republic, which was in essence the pro-
logue to the June 12 imbroglio, was tortuous and satiated with anxiety; and 
the architect of this perplexing situation was the Babangida administration. 
Although it has been noted elsewhere that the military, probably fatigued from 
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coups and the cumbersome burden of governing a resilient and sophisticated 
polity, decided to relinquish power to democratically elected civilians in 1993,4 
it might be safe to argue, in retrospect, that the Nigerian military probably 
suffers from "oligarchic patrimonialism." This is especially so given the man-
ner in which power seems to be transferred "ascriptively" among the military 
plutocrats at the apex of its hierarchy. Indeed, its monopoly on power mani-
fested itself during the continual metamorphoses from 1984-1993 (e.g., Generals 
Buhari-Babangida-Abacha-and possibly Diya). These leaders, in conjunc-
tion with their close military advisers set the political agenda for the republic. 
For instance, in 1985, the Armed Forces Ruling Council (AFRC) , in its 
rudimentary strategy to hand-over power to a civilian government, set up a 
l7-member Political Bureau (PB). The raison d'etre of the PB was to review 
and assess Nigeria'S political history, and identifY the fundamental pitfalls which 
precipitated the failures in the past. The PB's mandate was to identifY tactics 
for mollifYing the country's intricate problems. It was hoped that such strate-
gies might be conducive to the instauration of the Third republic. 
Following its deliberations, the PB advised the AFRC, among other fac-
tors, that the number of political parties in the republic be restricted and con-
densed to two in order to promote a politics based on ideology and principles 
rather than ethnicity.5 The AFRC acceded to the recommendations of the PB, 
augmenting them with the following as the logical basis for the two-party sys-
tem: 1. Political associations were dominated by a few rich individuals; 2. asso-
ciations were interested in serving their parochial interests instead of the nation; 
3. the groups showed the very deficiencies of intolerance and self-aggrandize-
ment which brought about the collapse of earlier experiments in democracy; 
4. the associations paid little attention to the organizational structures at the 
grassroots leve1.6 Before the condensation of the political parties into two, there 
were approximately 49 registered associations. 7 
Ideologically, Sam Oyovbaire (a member of the PB) contended that the 
two-party system would "set the stage for the gradual clarification of our choice 
and locus in accordance with the great historical systems--i.e., capitalism and 
socialism [with the National Republican Convention (NRC) espousing capital-
istic doctrine and Social Democratic Party (SDP), socialistic dogma.]"B 
Having accepted this modality, the major task confronting the AFRC, con-
tended Pita Agbese, was the promulgation of certain concrete programs designed 
to accomplish the goal of democratic stability. These objectives were: 1. Enactment 
of laws to preclude "bad" Nigerians from hijacking the politics of the Third 
Republic; 2. state funding of political parties and electioneering campaigns so 
as to de-emphasize the role of private money in politics; 3. establishment of 
state agencies such as the Center for Democratic Studies (CDS) and Mass 
Mobilization for Social and Economic Recovery (MAMSER) to teach, incul-
cate and induce democratic behavior; 4. direct supervision of elections and 
other aspects of the transition program by the AFRC; and 5. the establishment 
of two "grassroots" political parties to permit mass participation in politics.9 
It was on the basis of these essential conditions that the parties went into 
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political contestation. It was, however, not too long before the problematic pol-
itics that were reminiscent of Nigeria's atavistic struggle for power (e.g., cor-
ruption, electoral rigging, etc.) unfolded and came to the fore. 
The gubernatorial and state legislative elections were held in 1991, but in 
a real sense, the true locus of power, prestige, and, in fact, national concern 
was the presidential office. It is, therefore, to a brief analysis of this significant 
step in the march toward the revival of democracy in Third Republic that I 
now tum because it served as the premonitary omen to the June 12, 1993 
presidential election,-the outcome of which posed a challenge to the pertinent 
groups within the Nigerian civil society. 
The political duel between the SDP and NRC in the odyssey toward demo-
cratic governance in Nigeria was discordant and at times fierce. The decision 
by the two parties not to perform legitimately in the final stages of the elec-
toral process was not only confounding, but also left many observers profoundly 
perplexed in light of previous difficulties and experiences which led to the resur-
gence of the military. 
In the environment of extreme cynicism which characterized the entire 
transition scheme, the parties in their intra-party fracases gave venomous ammu-
nition to those skeptics of the two-party system and of the AFRC, itsel£ They 
maintained that the real issue in Nigerian politics was the lack of commitment 
and obligation to a democratic political culture and that this oversight was 
likely to lead to the abortion of the Third Republic. 10 It was against the back-
ground of such perturbing/conjectures that the federal legislative primary and 
more importantly the 'executive primary elections were conducted 
in 1992. . 
The Presidential Election of 1992 and 1993 
It is safe to contend that because of the high stakes involved in capturing 
the presidential office, the political actors construed the intraparty competition 
to become the flagbearers of their parties the "mother of all batdes." Hence, 
the chief principals, Olu Falae and Shehu Musa Yar' Adua (SDP), and Adamu 
Ciroma and Umaru Shinkafi (NRC) believed that they had to win at all costs. 
Litde wonder, then, that the primary elections were mired by massive rigging 
and what Karl Maier termed the politics of "moneytocracy" in which "money, 
fertilizers and even salt, rather than ideology or campaign platform became the 
big vote getters." 1 1 In fact, reacting to the wanton and egregious political dis-
crepancies, Ibrahim Babangida told the nation that: "The raison d' etre of the 
administration's transition to civil rule program initiated in 1986... is that 
Nigerians should make a clean break from the unedifYing history of political 
brinkmanship that had been her unfortunate lot hitherto... indeed, it can be 
said that the history of the past seven years had been an epic batde waged 
relendessly by the forces of change against the cliques and cabals that profited 
immensely from the retrogressive politics which we seek to supplant."12 The 
result of these political anomalies was the cancellation of the September 1992 
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presidential primaries, the urging of the parties to try again, and the deferment 
of the date of military abdication from power for a civilian president. 
Prelude to the June 12, 1993 Election 
It is true that the political class, especially those charged with designing a 
modality for the electoral process, worked assiduously and diligendy in tackling 
the problem of electoral rigging--one of the banes of the two previous republics. 
First, the National Electoral Commission (NEG) adopted the open-ballot sys-
tem. This was a system whereby electorates queued in front of the portrait of 
the contestant of their choice, so that they could be visibly seen by everyone 
present and counted by the electoral officers. The assumption was that since 
the process was done in the open, it would be difficult for unscrupulous polit-
ical stalwarts to be fraudulent. Although this framework received plaudits from 
such a politician as Baba Gana Kingibe, chairman of SDP, who boasted that, 
"open ballot system will in a short while constitute Africa's major contribution 
to democracy,"13 the NRC took a somewhat dim view of the open-ballot sys-
tem. Indeed, the NRC opted for a modification of the procedure. It suggested 
the adoption of an instrument which it termed the "open-secret" ballot system. 
The party claimed that the eclectic model (derived from a combination of the 
secret and open-ballot systems) had all the attributes of the open-ballot system 
with the exception that "the thumb printing and sealing of the ballot paper is 
done in secret, while the v,Oter drops a paper in a box placed outside for all 
to see."14 
Paradoxically, this strategy that was intended to purge the system of its 
conflictual electoral practices of the past failed at the presidential level. The 
NEC, determined to resolve and ameliorate this problem before the June 12, 
1993 election, concocted another approach dubbed Option 4. 
Basic to Option 4, as a framework for the presidential election, was that 
each state of the federation was capable of producing a presidential candidate-
the so-called favorite son concept. Therefore, the plan was for each state to 
elect two presidential candidates, one each from both parties at the state con-
gress. The elected contestants would then meet at a national convention of 
both parties where they were to jockey for votes among elected and special 
representatives of the SDP and NRC. The result. of the convention would be 
the selection of one candidate from each party. 
The National Conventions scheduled for March 27-29, 1993, in which 62 
contestants were expected to participate, made provisions for two ballots. Before 
the first ballot would be cast, aspirants were allotted three minutes each to 
address delegates to the convention, emphasizing their platforms and vision for 
the republic. In the second ballot successful candidates who survived the first 
round would be given fifteen minutes to expatiate their policies and the direc-
tion that they wished to lead the country. IS 
In the NRC convention held in Port Harcourt, Rivers state, Bashir Tofa 
convincingly emerged as the party's presidential candidate. In the SDP con-
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vention held in Jos, Plateau state, Moshood A~iola barely squeaked by Baba 
Gana Kingibe (3617 to 3225 votes).16 
Arguably, it was politically soothing, that in both cases the conventions 
were conducted adequately, that Tofa and Abiola received support from their 
parties without major commotions. In fact, somewhat uncharacteristic of the 
political game in Nigeria was Kingibe's magnanimity in defeat. He said: "I 
want to assure anyone from the opposition party who believes there would be 
cracks within the ranks of the SDP that they will be disappointed. We shall 
march forward together now, and by the grace of God and in the name of 
the people, capture the presidency for our great party, for the people and for 
Chief Abiola .... We submitted ourselves to the democratic process, and to the 
will of the people as represented by the delegates who attended the conven-
tion as democrats, and we bent to the will of the people."17 Indeed, the tra-
ditionally "taciturn" Japanese ambassador to Nigeria, who was one of the 
observers noted: "I have been keeping my eyes open and I can say that it has 
been orderly .... The aspirants participated according to the rules of the game 
and I can say from what I have seen that Nigeria is the largest democracy in 
Mrica."18 
It might be difficult to ascribe the result or success of Option 4 to astute 
political engineering. The fact, though, was that it was efficacious probably 
because the republic was suffering from electoral fatigue, and was detennined 
to do whatever it took to consummate the process and consequently put a stop 
to the Babangida administt;ation which had promised to hand over power to 
a civilian government on August 27, 1993. 19 
To give impetus to the electoral process, as· it were, and to ensure fair-
play, a decree titled, "Presidential Election (Basic Constitution) and Provision 
Decree 13," was promUlgated. The decree affinned that the presidential can-
didates were not immune to disqualification should fresh evidence come to light 
of their legal and political culpability in the past. Section 54(1) of the decree 
also noted that "where a date has been appointed for holding of an election 
and there is reason to apprehend that a serious breach of the peace is likely 
to occur if the election is proceeded with on that day, the election may be 
postponed by the commission until some convenient day."20 To add muscle to 
the decree, the NEC reminded the candidates of the tenets of Decree 27 of 
1989, which stipulates, inter alia, that "no political campaign shall be made on 
the basis of sectional, ethnic or religious grounds or consideration. . . . The 
objective of the decree is to remove violence and ensure a civilized political 
campaign ... "21 The NEC then affirmed emphatically that the presidential elec-
tionwould be held come hell or high water on June 12, 1993, and would not 
brook any action that was likely to lead to its defennent.22 
The foregoing discussion is intended to explain the political psychology and 
chemistry of the Nigerian polity leading to the June 12 presidential election. 
In a way, it is aimed at shedding light on the possible rationale for the reac-
tions that followed, in the wake of the annulment of that election. 
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June 12 Election 
The June 12, 1993 presidential election might remain a significant mile-
stone in Nigeria's political history because of the peaceful manner in which 
the electorate expressed their franchise at the polling booth. The major polit-
ical actors were Moshood Abiola and Baba Gana Kingibe (presidential and 
vice-presidential candidates for the SDP), and Bashir Tofa and Sylvester Ugoh 
(presidential and vice-presidential candidates for the NRC). Geo-ethnically and 
religiously, Abiola was a southerner, Y oruba and Moslem, while Kingibe was 
a northerner, Kanuri and Moslem. In the case of NRC, Tofa was a north-
erner, Kanuri and Moslem, while Ugoh, was a southerner, an Tho and Christian. 
These distinctions tend to influence the voting behavior. 
Strategically Abiola emphasized his desire to redeem the country from its 
economic quagmire, and Tofa stressed, in particular, the ethno-religious bal-
anced ticket. 23 In the political contestation, it was alleged that, "the SDP was 
able to pick a majority of votes in both the Northern and Southern minority 
areas populated by mosdy Christians, make a mincemeat of some Northern 
conservative states like Kaduna, Kano and Borno, make an inroad into the 
core Eastern states that it was initially expected to lose outright while keeping 
to itself the Western part populated by the Yorubas, Abiola's ethnic groUp."24 
The projected results are presented in Table 1 (at the end of the essay). It sug-
gests that the SDP won 19 states, including the Federal Territory of Abuja, 
while the NRC won 11 states.25 The election that was relatively peaceful by 
Nigerian standard was, however, said to have been mired by irregularities such 
as massive rigging. In addition, the voter turnout was said to have been low 
(approx. 14 million) as a result of the confusion brought about by the Association 
for a Better Nigeria (ABN) which sought an injunction to postpone the elec-
tions due to alleged malpractices by the parties.26 Such politics in the struggle 
for power mimicked previous attemptsY It was clear in the eyes of the Babangida 
administration that despite the presumed orderliness of the June 12 election 
and its legitimization by the national and international observers, it lacked the 
electoral "perfection" that the administration envisioned, and thus it annulled 
the election. In his address to the nation on June 26, 1993, explaining the 
rationale for his action, Babangida affirmed: 
History would bear witness that as an administration we have always striven, in all our 
policy decisions, to build the foundation of lasting democracy. Lasting democracy is not a tem-
porary show of excitement and manipulation by over-articulate section of the elite and its cap-
tive audience. Lasting democracy is a permanent diet to nurture the soul of the whole nation 
and the political process. Therefore, it is logical, as we have always insisted upon, that lasting 
democracy must be equated with political stability. Informed by our sad experience of history, 
we require nothing short of a foundation for lasting democracy. As an administration we can-
not afford to lead Nigeria into a Third Republic with epileptic convulsion in its democratic 
health ... 28 
The preceding was presented to the nation in an attempt to mollifY an 
exasperated citizenry which became skeptical about the true intentions of the 
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military in the politics of Nigeria. Additionally, he noted the following as the 
causes for the administration's actions: 
I. There were allegations of irregularities and other acts of bad conduct levelled against 
the presidential candidates but the NEC (National Electoral Commission) went ahead 
and cleared them. 
2. There were proofs as well as documented evidence of widespread use of money during 
the party primaries as well as the presidential election. These were the same bad con-
duct for which the party presidential primaries of 1992 were canceled. Evidence avail-
able to the Govermnent put the total amount of money spent by the presidential candidates 
at over N2.1 bn. The use of money was again the major source of undermining the elec-
toral process ... 
3. There were cases of documented and confirmed conflict of interest between the gov-
ermnent and both Presidential aspirants which would compromise their positions and 
responsibilities were they to become President ... 29 
It was in view of the foregoing reasons that the National Defence and 
Security Council called for another presidential election under the supervision 
of a recomposed National Electoral Commission.30 
Whereas the aforementioned indictments of the political parties might appear 
cogent and logical, the perplexity of the government's action issues from the 
fact that the abrogation of the election occurred ex poste focto, unlike the can-
cellation of the September 22, 1992 presidential primaries which occurred imme-
diately following the discovery of irregularities. Indeed, it is such complexities 
in Nigerian politics that prompted Celestine Bassey to assert that not even a 
probabilistic theory could/be devised to explain the republic's political in-
stability. This was so because of the unpredictability of Nigeria's conftictual 
politics.3i 
In any case, the chain reactions engendered by the government's edict nul-
lifying the June 12, 1993 election provided the rallying cry for the somewhat 
"somnolent" civil society to resuscitate the democracy that was moribund as a 
result of military interventions in the country. It is on this development that I 
now focus my proceeding analysis. 
The Civil Society and the National DeD10cratic Coalition 
(NADECO): The Struggle for DeD10cratic Renaissance 
The concept of the civil society within a national polity is a complex one, 
especially in the over-centralized governments of developing nations. But what 
is civil society? Definitionally, S.F. Starr notes that within the concept of Western 
tradition, civil society refers to that political space or universe that is "distinct 
from government and that government is but one of the several institutions 
coexisting in a pluralistic social fabric."32 Noami Chazan's definition applies 
mutatis mutandis to the preceding thesis. She notes that the concept of civil soci-
ety denotes that sector of society that interacts with the states, exacts pressure 
and power on the state, and yet conspicuously different from the state.33 Alfred 
Stepan, describes a civil society as "an arena where manifold social movements 
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. . . and civic organizations from all classes. .. attempt to constitute themselves 
in an assemble of arrangements so that they can express themselves and advance 
their interests."34 
The emergence of civil society in Nigeria pre-dates its birth as an inde-
pendent nation-state in 1960. In fact, it was the convocation of intellectuals 
(and political activists) in major cities, and the later articulation of their inter-
ests that resulted in the cessation of colonial rule in Nigeria. To attain this 
objective, the intellectuals led the political movement against the colonial admin-
istration by coordinating the activities of the various cleavages and (ethnic) 
groups in their demand for independence. Following independence, however, 
these social groups became weak as their members were assimilated into the 
political system that they displaced. Paradoxically, it was their weakness and 
ineffectiveness in governing an enormous country with diverse ethnic groups 
that has led to over two decades of military administration in Nigeria. 
Arguably, a series of exogenous and endogenous events may have con-
tributed to the formation of NADECO as a voluntary association, within the 
civil society, to press for the return to democracy in Nigeria. 
Exogenously, some Western powers including the United States and Britain 
imposed economic (and political) sanctions of some sort on Nigeria following 
the nullification of the June l~; 1993 presidential election. The effect within 
the business community and the general populace was problematical. It was 
difficult to buy spare parts, to acquire foreign exchange, undertake foreign trips, 
et cetera; and, for the gra&sroots, there was unemployment, inflation, malaise, 
and alienation. Additionally, there was the psychological impact of the South 
Mrican elections which culminated in the victory of the Mrican National 
Congress (ANC). NADECO and other groups saw the installation of Nelson 
Mandela as the president of the Republic of South Mrica as a possible cata-
lyst for a democratic rebirth in Nigeria. Indeed, to most Nigerian elites this 
metamorphosis in South Mrica was ironic since Nigeria that has continually 
clamored for democracy in that country was still under the grips of military 
praetorian rule. In truth, the democratic success in South Mrica galvanized 
NADECO and members of the informed public in the movement for democ-
racy in Nigeria. 
Endogenously, many Nigerians have become weary of the military's "cae-
sarism" in Nigeria's post-independence political history. Indeed, as if to under-
score the anxiety issuing from the military's incessant rule in Nigeria, a former 
Supreme court justice, Udo Udoma, noted in an interview in The A.ftican Guardian 
that: " ... Now they [the military] have lost the [will] and skill of fighting as 
soldiers in the field. They are now being trained as politicians. That is a very 
dangerous situation; . .. and, we must retrace our steps [and] get rid of the 
military. Let the military do its own assignment-protect the country [and] 
maintain their skills as warriors. . .. They must respect the government of the 
day and be loyal to it. That is very important."35 
Although the above summarizes the relative attitude of some members of 
the informed public and political class toward the military, the annulment of 
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the June 12, 1993 election which would have ushered in the Third Republic 
may have been the coup de grace in the civil society's patience with the mil-
itary rule in Nigeria. The actions of the civil society toward the Interim National 
Government (lNG) of Ernest Shonekan, sworn-in by Babangida, and Abacha's 
military administration bear this out. 
NADECO, which represents an amalgam of democratic organizations, is 
supported by such significant actors as Anthony Enahoro, Michael Ajasin, Ebitu 
Ukiwe, Dan Suleiman, Beko Ransome Kuti, just to list a few. 36 On May 14, 
1994, the organization, in its inchoate battle against the military for democracy 
in the republic issued an ultimatum in its communique to the Abacha admin-
istration. It gave the administration 15 days (i.e., May 31) to relinquish power, 
and to hand over authority to Moshood Abiola, assumed to have won the June 
12, 1993 presidential election. Thereafter, Abiola was to form a broad-based 
national government made up of diverse ethnic and interest groups in the coun-
try to provide the legitimacy with which to govern. Moreover, NADECO argued 
that, "the military government as an institution is essentially authoritarian and 
cannot midwife democracy. The military government is not qualified by its 
antecedents, disposition and track record and has no moral standing to orga-
nize a proper sovereign national conference as desired by Nigerians."37 
But such rhetorical fulminations were offset by equally impressive flourishes 
from the Abacha administration. In fact, as a riposte, the government's posi-
tion was not to recognize NADECO as a political force. Moreover, it affirmed 
that the organization was illegal,38 and in order to cripple it and similar groups, 
it directed that: "Any association seeking registration that does not give full 
details of its objectives must not be registered. And any of such associations 
mistakingly registered already should have their certificates revoked with imme-
diate effect."39 
Although these tactics of intimidation applied by the government might be 
reminiscent of, and analogous to, those strategies applied by the colonial power, 
NADECO remained defiant at least in its public proclamations for a democ-
ratic renaissance in Nigeria. In a statement entitled, "The People Shall Overcome: 
A Progressive Report by the National Democratic Coalition (NADECO)," the 
group alluded to the motives of the organization. A selected and concise sum-
mary of the group's communique regarding the political confrontation with the 
military is as follows: 
On the 12th of May, 1994, NADECO was set up by several Democratic and Human 
Rights Organizations to work, among other things, for: 
* the restoration of authentic democracy and genuine federalism in Nigeria; 
* a Sovereign National Conference composed of popularly elected representatives of the 
ethnic groups and established professional and other national interest groups in the country; 
* the actualization of June 12 through democratic measures; 
* a broad-based National Government of Reconciliation and National Unity, committed to 
democratic values, to be formed as an outcome of June 12 ... 40 
One of the major bones of contention between NADECO and the mili-
tary administration derives from the issue of support for the National Constitutional 
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Conference established by the regime to write a new constitution for the repub-
lic's democratic genre. While the position of NADECO was for the formation 
of a Sovereign National Conference to thrash out the issue of the National 
Question (e.g., state formation, federalism, etc.), the Abacha regime insisted that 
its constituted conference was preferable and non-negotiable. In a way, there-
fore, this arrangement strategically gave the government major regulatory con-
trol over the conference's deliberations. 
So far, in the political tussle between the military government and NADECO 
in the democratization process, the military's position has prevailed. Nevertheless, 
given the nature and complexity of Nigerian politics, a successful outcome of 
the National Constitutional Conference should by no means imply that the 
political problems in the country are over. Witness, for example, the Babangida 
administration's transition program and the demise of the Third Republic. 
Seeking a Conunon Ground: Toward the Fourth Republic 
It has become increasingly clear that the political class and other groups 
in the civil society may clamor ad irifinitum for democracy, but not until they 
pledge themselves to adhere to the established rules of the political game, and 
reason with the military leader~hip, their efforts will be in vain. Mter all, the 
military has a monopoly on 'the instrument of coercion, and have used it 
effectively to sustain itself in power. 
The writing of a new constitution, while significant, cannot guarantee good 
governance or solve Nigeria's political problems, unless the political class, the 
civil society, and the military are committed to live by the tenets of the doc-
ument. In short, good constitutions don't govern; humans (with their numer-
ous frailties) do. The issue, then, is how might the relevant groups in the polity 
join forces to govern effectively. Whereas answers to this difficult query are 
numerous and diverse, it might be necessary to revisit and re-examine an old 
debate that could possibly resolve some of the problems of political instability, 
at least in the short run, while long term solutions are worked out. 
Empirical data in the First, Second and aborted Third Republic suggest 
that the attitude of members of the political class left much to be desired in 
the manner in which they conducted themselves politically. The query, there-
fore, is could the politicians perform admirably to the point that the military 
might be induced to play the subordinate role in the polity? Sociologically, it 
could be argued that because the military has become so entrenched within 
the political system, that at this juncture of democratic development a com-
plete divorce after over two decades in power, while helpful in the democra-
tic process, is problematic. For example, the military in its constitutional 
engineering and interest has insisted that there should be no provision made 
in the constitution to outlaw a military coup. What this "window of opportu-
nity" implies is that the military wishes to play a role in the political develop-
ment of the country regardless of the opposition to the military's political 
participation in the republic by some members of the political class and civil 
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Table 1 
A breakdown if the Presidential polls as tendered by the Campaign for 
in a Lagos Court 
States Presidential Elections Results 1993 
State SDP SDP NRC NRC 
Score 0/0 Score 0/0 
1. Abia 105,273 41.04 151,227 58.96 
2. Adarnawa 140,875 45.72 167,239 54.28 
3. Akwa Thorn 214,787 51.86 199,342 48.14 
4. Anarnbra 212,024 57.11 159,258 42.89 
5. Bauchi 339,339 39.27 524,836 60.73 
6. Benue 246,830 56.94 186,302 43.06 
7. Borno 153,496 54.40 128,684 45.60 
8. Cross River 189,303 55.23 153,452 44.77 
9. Delta 327,277 69.30 145,001 30.70 
10. Edo 205,407 66.48 103,572 33.52 
11. Enugu 263,101 48.09 284,050 51.91 
12. Irno 159,350 44.86 195,836 55.14 
13. Jigawa 138,552 60.67 89,836 39.33 
14. Kaduna 389,713 52.20 356,860 47.80 
15. Kano 169,619 52.28 154,809 47.72 
16. Katsina 171,162 38.70 271,077 61.30 
17. Kebbi 70,219 32.66 144,808 67.34 
18. Kogi 222,,760 45.60 265,732 54.40 
19. Kwara 272,270 77.24 80,209 22.78 
20. Lagos 883,965 85.54 149,432 14.46 
21. Niger 136,350 38.10 221,437 61.90 
22. Ogun 425,725 87.78 59,246 12.22 
23. Ondo 883,024 84.42 162,994 15.58 
24. Osun 365,266 83.52 72,068 16.48 
25. Oyo 536,011 83.52 105,788 16.48 
26. Plateau 417,565 61.68 259,394 38.32 
27. Rivers 370,578 36.63 640,973 63.37 
28. Sokoto 97,726 20.79 372,250 79.21 
29. Taraba 101,887 61.42 64,001 38.58 
30. Yobe 111,887 63.59 64,061 38.41 
31. FCT Abuja 19,968 52.16 18,313 47.84 
TOTAL 8,341,309 58.36 5,952,087 41.64 
Source: The News, Gune 28, 1993), p. 24. 
society. Indeed, in an interview with Odumegu-Ojukwu (a member 
National Constitutional Conference) on Nigerian politics, he asserted, al~lUl.L~ 
other things, that: "Let me not deceive anybody, there is no-way you can 
ban coups. What you can do is to make coups not possible. . .. [But] 
the military go to coup? The simple answer in one word. Profit. It is 
repair the nation or do anything as glorious as you read in the 
hear on the radio ... "41 So, given the military's proclivity to intervene 
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system for its benefit, and the inability of the less fortitudinous political class 
to confront the armed forces (as was the case with Yeltsin and the pro-democ-
racy movement in Russia), a probable strategy might be to bring the military 
into the process at levels that are "less" political. 
For instance, Larry Diamond has argued that the experience of the Second 
Republic made it clear that a number of institutions should be moved from 
the control of elected officials and entrusted to the military. These were the 
Code of Conduct Bureau and Tribunal responsible for punishing corrupt offi-
cials, The Federal and State Electoral Commissions, The Police Service Com-
mission, inter alia.42 I contend, in spite of the sensitivity of this issue, that such 
a dualism between the military and civilians is not unlikely to promote stabil-
ity. This argument stems from the republic's past political experiences, whereby 
the military is reluctant to relinquish power. Such an arrangement should be 
in place while members of the political class endeavor to rededicate themselves 
to the principles of good governance. In fact, Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe has noted 
that: "[It is] not that the military caste is perfect or that civilians are imper-
fect, but that civil rule depends upon the military establishment as a sanction 
for the maintenance and enforcement of the law. Until developing nations have 
had sufficient experience and maturity in handling human problems with reason 
and finesse, and until they have:become disciplined in their personal lives, com-
munity living, and the exercise of political rights and privileges ... incorporat-
ing the military hierarchy on a more active basis in a civilian-based administration 
to make it stable [is not an, unreasonable proposal at this juncture of the nation's 
political development.]43 Such a marriage of convenience, it has been contended 
elsewhere, should be ad hoc,44 as the political class demonstrates leadership by 
example. Indeed, in the words of Victor Hugo: "A great army can capture an 
enemy city, but to rule it requires a great idea."45 This is one possible para-
digm for resolving Nigeria's political instability as it marches toward the Fourth 
Republic. 
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